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Abstract
This article examines the exposure to and management of carbon risks of different
investor types. Considering the dual role as portfolio manager and partial owner, we
analyze carbon risk for investors both in terms of exposure to portfolio values and in
terms of responsibility as shareholder of carbon-intensive firms. We show that
among various investor types, the preference for holding carbon-intensive stocks dif-
fers substantially, even when considering traditional investment decision parameters.
In particular, it is governments whose portfolio values are most threatened by a car-
bon risk exposure of 49%, but at the same time, they prefer larger ownership shares
in polluting firms. In contrast, individual investors, investment advisors, and mutual
funds avoid holding stakes in these firms, while revealing only a moderate exposure
of their assets to carbon risk. In view of the Paris Agreement, which includes the con-
sistent steering of financial flows towards a low carbon transformation of the econ-
omy, our study provides policymakers with important implications regarding the
coverage and effects of respective regulations. By identifying the ownership struc-
tures of carbon-intensive firms and respective owners' portfolio compositions, we
also offer implications for further research on portfolio decarbonization and share-
holders' influence of corporate carbon management.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC), Carbon Dioxide (CO2) accounts for about three quarters of
global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and is likely to be the main
driver for anthropogenic global warming (IPCC, 2014). As a result,
policymakers around the world are considering various plans for
reducing carbon emissions and aim to mitigate the detrimental con-
sequences of rising temperatures for business and society. Even
though there have been some significant achievements, such as the
Paris Agreement (UNFCCC, 2015), the implementation process of
the agreed measures for carbon emission reductions is rather
lengthy, difficult to enforce, and subject to regular changes. Espe-
cially due to the discrepancy between the primary emitters and
those who are already suffering from climate change, combating cli-
mate change is one of the most difficult ethical issues facing today's
economy and society (Dahlmann, Branicki, & Brammer, 2019). Fur-
thermore, the cost of carbon as well as the decarbonization of key
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industries is expected to lead to significant economic and societal
changes in the long run (Nordhaus, 2017).
It has been argued that the dependence on carbon emissions
for businesses will be quite substantial (Carbon Tracker
Initiative, 2013; Stern & Stern, 2007). The uncertainty about how
upcoming actions on reducing carbon emissions will impact firms'
future cash flow is often referred to as carbon risk (Dupré
et al., 2015). Estimates suggest that in order to achieve the 2C-goal
set in Paris, about three quarters of all remaining coal, oil, and gas
reserves should not be exploited (Le Quéré et al., 2015). Such a sce-
nario will create so-called stranded assets, that is, assets losing
their economic value well ahead of their anticipated useful lifetime.
This situation could create a “carbon bubble” in the valuation of
carbon-intensive companies. Furthermore, corporate management
also needs to handle possible changes in customer demand or
reputational risk related to being classified as unsustainable or
high-polluting. The negative effects of carbon emissions are becom-
ing increasingly clear to society and policymakers so that investors
and shareholders must also respond to these environmental
demands and handle associated risks (Cubas-Díaz & Sedano, 2018).
With the growth in environmentally responsible investments and
the emergence of voluntary initiatives such as the Portfolio Deca-
rbonization Coalition (PDC, 2020) or Principles of Responsible
Investment (PRI, 2020), a growing number of institutional and also
individual investors are becoming aware of the risks associated with
climate change and increasingly integrate environmental criteria into
their investment decisions.
Aim of this article is to analyze the behavior of different investor
types in dealing with these risks and changes. According to the dual
function as a portfolio manager and partial owner, we analyze an
investor's carbon risk from both perspectives. In addition to evaluating
the carbon risk at the investor portfolio level, we provide important
insights into the ownership structure of carbon-intensive firms. Fur-
thermore, we reveal that the carbon intensity of a firm, in addition to
the conventional risk–return based firm characteristics, is a relevant
factor in the investment decision process of most investors.
In particular, we first analyze the extent to which the portfolio
values of the investor types are threatened by carbon risks. We show
that government agencies account for by far the largest share of
carbon-intensive portfolio values, averaging 49.45%. In contrast, the
remaining types of investors have a relatively low carbon risk expo-
sure, averaging between 15.27% and 24.34%, and thus tend to be
below the market-inherent exposure to carbon risks. Our analysis also
shows that all investor types are pursuing a steady reduction in the
carbon exposure of their portfolio values from 2012 onwards.
In parallel to their function as portfolio managers, investors also
play an important role in the ownership structure and thus as poten-
tial influencers of corporate management. We show that here, too,
governments hold the largest ownership share (over 27%) of the
carbon-intensive companies held in their portfolios.
However, considering the aggregated total value of all carbon-
intensive companies, governments represent a rather subordinate
group of owners with 2.29%. Hedge funds and investment advisors
are particularly dominant in this view, each with around 13% owner-
ship in carbon-intensive firms.
To make a reliable assessment of whether an investor type has a
preference for or against carbon-intensive investments, we include
corporate carbon intensity alongside the traditional risk–return based
firm characteristics to explain the variation in ownership shares per
investor type. We find that exclusively governments exhibit a signifi-
cant preference for carbon-intensive firms, whereas individuals,
investment advisors, and mutual funds generally show a significant
aversion to carbon-intensive firms.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 dis-
cusses the theoretical background as well as related literature. Sec-
tion 3 presents the identification of carbon-intensive firms. Section 4
explains the methodology applied to evaluate investors' carbon risk
and to investigate the carbon-related preferences of different owner
types. Section 5 provides summary statistics of our sample. Section 6
provides the results of our empirical analysis, and Section 7 contains
conclusions, implications, and limitations of the study.
2 | BACKGROUND AND RELATED
LITERATURE
The need for decarbonization of the global economy to limit the
impacts of climatic change has become an increasingly important
topic over the last decades. Already in 2011, estimates suggested
only 20% of all remaining coal, oil and gas reserves could be burned
unabated by 2050 to reduce the chance of exceeding 2C global
warming (Leaton, Campanale, & Leggett, 2011). This scenario will
create so-called stranded assets, i.e. the 80% remaining assets lose
their economic value well ahead of their anticipated useful lifetime,
leading to a carbon bubble in the valuation of carbon-intensive com-
panies (Ritchie & Dowlatabadi, 2015). As companies generate a sig-
nificant amount of carbon emissions through the production and
supply of goods and services, it has long been the aim to reduce
these emissions. Several emissions trading schemes such as, for
example, the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EUETS)
have been implemented worldwide, some of which follow the Kyoto
commitments and others by countries that have not signed the
Kyoto protocol (Perdan & Azapagic, 2011). A previously more or less
free or low-cost activity has, therefore, become costly, and compa-
nies are now faced with potential additional costs due to carbon
taxes or the requirement to provide allowances based on their car-
bon emissions (Cook, 2009). The uncertainty about how upcoming
actions on reducing carbon emissions will impact firms is often
referred to as carbon risk and is expected to have high impact and
relevance for companies with exposure to carbon emissions in any
part of their business (Leaton et al., 2011).
Investors such as institutionals,1 hedge funds, individuals, govern-
mental agencies, investment advisors, and mutual funds function as
capital provider for companies. Since our analysis focuses on the car-
bon risk intensity of the portfolios of these investor groups, it is
1In this article, the collective term “institutionals” is used for the following institutional
investors: banks, trusts, insurances, pension as well as endowment funds, and foundations.
BENZ ET AL. 283
crucial to first understand how carbon risk affects the investee com-
panies. Accordingly, we give a brief overview of the literature relating
to the influence of different carbon risk aspects on firms' characteris-
tics such as risk, cost of capital, market value, and different kind of
financial performance measures such as the stock return, risk-adjusted
returns, return on equity (ROE), return on assets (ROA), and Tobin's Q.
In general, a firm's exposure to carbon risk is determined by its
dependence on carbon-based materials, such that carbon risk as a
new type of corporate risk could lead to an increase in the firm's over-
all risk. As a consequence, investors should require a higher return,
which increases both the cost of equity (Kim, An, & Kim, 2015) and
the cost of debt financing (Jung, Herbohn, & Clarkson, 2018) for
carbon-intensive firms. However, if a firm manages its carbon risk pro-
fessionally and pursues a long-term reduction strategy, it may be able
to lower their overall corporate risk (Cai, Cui, & Jo, 2016). The same
conclusion was reached by Xue, Zhang, and Li (2019) who find a sig-
nificant impact of environmental management performance (a firm's
environmental policy or processes) and an insignificant impact of envi-
ronmental operational performance (a firm's carbon emissions) on
firm-specific risk. Investors should therefore bear in mind that the
increased carbon risk of the companies they are invested in also
affects their risk structure. At the same time, investors could also use
their role as owners to monitor carbon risk management and thus
reduce this type of risk.
As shown by Oestreich and Tsiakas (2015), emissions trading
schemes such as the EUETS have a vast impact on the carbon man-
agement of firms. To emit CO2, firms must be in possession of emis-
sion certificates, typically leading to additional costs for emitting
firms. Often, a share of the certificates is “grandfathered,” that is, allo-
cated freely to companies based on past emissions, while permits are
traded by emitters who are liable to hold a sufficient number of certif-
icates for their emissions. Oestreich and Tsiakas (2015) show a large
and statistically significant carbon premium in stock returns for com-
panies that were able to sell the initially free emission allowances in
Germany and the United Kingdom from 2003 to 2009. At the same
time, they find that companies that did not have this opportunity had
their returns reduced by the costs. A similar relation was found by
Brouwers, Schoubben, and van Hulle (2018) who show that some
companies can pass on the cost of carbon to their customers because
they have no competing companies in their field and can set their
own prices. According to their study, a good carbon performance
(lower emissions) only leads to better financial performance for com-
panies that are not able to pass on their carbon costs. As emission
trading schemes are on the rise (Tuerk & Zelljadt, 2016) and more and
more countries and regions develop emissions trading schemes, inves-
tors need to be aware of this additional cost factor, which could
directly reduce the return of the companies invested.
A theoretical framework for the relation between the level of car-
bon emissions and financial performance was developed by Busch
and Hoffmann (2011). They show a positive relationship between a
better carbon performance and Tobin's Q, which they attribute to
increased market value for firms with lower emissions. This is
supported by many studies, for example, Aggarwal and Dow (2011) as
well as Saka and Oshika (2014) who also find a negative relation
between carbon emissions and the equity value of a firm. Gallego-
Alvarez, Segura, and Martínez-Ferrero (2015) measure the influence
of carbon reduction on financial (ROE) and operational performance
and find a positive influence of the first and no significant impact of
the latter. Reducing carbon emissions is associated with increasing
environmental costs that drive the asymmetric relationship between
carbon emissions and Tobins' Q, as suggested by Misani and
Pogutz (2015). The authors show an increase in carbon performance
leading to a better financial performance up to a certain point; after
this point, the cost of reduction exceeds the added value. A more lin-
ear relation was found by Delmas, Nairn-Birch, and Lim (2015), show-
ing a higher long-term performance measured by Tobin's Q for firms
with improved carbon performance. They further show that in the
short term, the costs exceed the return leading to a negative relation
of carbon performance and short-term financial performance, mea-
sured by ROA. A similar relation between carbon and financial perfor-
mance was proposed by Trumpp and Guenther (2017). According to
their “too-little-of-a-good-thing” framework, it only pays to be green
after exceeding a minimum level of carbon performance. These find-
ings are supported by Lewandowski (2017), who shows a positive
(negative) financial performance for firms with superior (inferior) car-
bon performance. An exception to these results is provided by Wang,
Li, and Gao (2014), who find a positive effect of high emissions on
Tobin's Q for Australian firms. This could be explained by the impor-
tance of the mining industry for the Australian economy. As shown
above, most studies find a negative (positive) relation between carbon
emissions (carbon management) and a firm's performance.
Overall, existing research suggests that companies, and therefore
their investors, are largely affected by carbon emissions and carbon
management. First, investors are largely negatively influenced by the
level of carbon emissions. Investors of carbon-intensive companies
must bear these risks and should, therefore, be concerned about the
carbon risk exposure build up in their portfolio. The negative impact
of firms' carbon emissions is becoming increasingly clear to institu-
tional but also individual investors, leading to a growing number of
investor initiatives such as the PDC or Climate Action 100+. More
and more investors are taking a closer look at the environmental dis-
closures of firms and incorporate social, governmental, or, in the case
of this study, environmental criteria into their investment process
(Cunha et al., 2019). Many data providers (e.g., Refinitiv) have started
to assess investment opportunities based on their carbon perfor-
mance. This offers investors a transparent way to compare their
environmental and carbon performance (Ceccarelli, Ramelli, &
Wagner, 2020), and as shown by Riedl and Smeets (2017), investors
prefer sustainable mutual funds, despite their lower returns and
higher management fees. Investors are probably willing to waive
financial performance to support their individual social beliefs. Screen-
ing mechanisms based on the firm's emissions are also implemented
by institutional investors who underweight high emission firms in their
investment process (Bolton & Kacperczyk, 2020). In addition to
screening mechanisms aimed at excluding carbon-intensive compa-
nies, investors could also engage in trading in the sense of
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decarbonization, therefore selling carbon-intensive and buying non
carbon-intensive firms. Benz, Jacob, Paulus, and Wilkens (2020) even
show that trading in the sense of decarbonization triggers follow-up
trades by other investors, which represents herding behavior. The
increasing interest of investors in sustainable investment opportuni-
ties leads consequently to a growing number of green investment
vehicles that seek to incorporate not only financial but also social and
environmental aspects in their investment process. As a result, the
market for green investments and green label bonds has grown rapidly
in recent years due to increased investor interest in both the
European as well as the U.S. market (UNEP, 2020).
Second, in addition to the level of emissions, investors are also
affected by a firm's management of carbon risks. Since investors can
also be considered as partial owners of a company, they might be able
to influence corporate policy through their participation rights. Institu-
tional investors can therefore also influence the management of car-
bon risks and, as shown by Dyck, Lins, Roth, and Wagner (2019),
institutional ownership is positively related to future environmental
and social performance. This suggests that institutional investors
could also use their voting rights to improve the processes of corpo-
rate emissions management and thus reduce the long-term emissions
risk of the investees and therefore their portfolio.
Interestingly, the academic literature has not yet fully explored
the question of which type of investor is most invested in carbon-
intensive stocks and, therefore, is exposed to the highest share of car-
bon risk. With our research, we contribute to the literature and thor-
oughly analyze investor behavior and changes in the ownership
structure of carbon-intensive stocks for different investor types.
More precisely, we contribute to the literature by examining the
level of carbon risk intensity in portfolios of different types of inves-
tors. We expect these investor types to be exposed to carbon risk dif-
ferently: sophisticated asset managers such as hedge funds, mutual
funds, and investment advisors are aware of the risks associated with
an increased level of carbon emissions (Bolton & Kacperczyk, 2020),
which leads us to the hypothesis, that they will show a moderate car-
bon risk exposure. Similar expectations are drawn for norm-
constrained institutions such as pension funds and insurances (in this
research grouped as institutional investors). Hong and
Kacperczyk (2009) show that sin stocks (tobacco, alcohol, and gam-
bling) are held less often by these investors due to social norms. As
environmental aspects are becoming increasingly more relevant for
society, we expect to find similar relations concerning carbon-
intensive stocks. The investor structure of companies varies
depending on the industry in which the firm is active. Due to legal
framework conditions or security aspects, the share of state-owned
enterprises in strategic industries has been high in the past or is still
high. Strategic industries are mostly defined as financial, mining, utili-
ties, oil, military-related, or transportation, and as shown by Boubakri,
Cosset, and Guedhami (2009), the percentage of state-owned compa-
nies is high in these sectors. We later show that carbon-intensive
companies are strongly represented in these industries. Even though
we are only considering publicly traded companies for this study, we
expect governmental agencies to have a high carbon risk exposure
due to their selective investments in certain firms. Overall, we formu-
late the hypothesis that due to the above-mentioned increasing
awareness of all investors, the carbon risk exposure of all investor
groups will decrease in the more recent years of the study.
We further analyze the ownership structure of carbon-intensive
firms to measure the potential to influence corporate decisions for dif-
ferent owner types, for example, in a vote on a specifically submitted
shareholder proposal. It seems plausible that not all institutional inves-
tors are the same and their relation to their investee firms differs. As
shown by Almazan, Hartzell, and Starks (2005) and Chen, Harford,
and Li (2007), some institutional investors (such as insurance compa-
nies or bank trusts departments) have either existing or potential busi-
ness relationships with the companies they hold and may be less
willing to challenge management decisions to protect those relation-
ships, while other investor groups (such as investment advisors and
investment firms) are more willing to challenge management deci-
sions. Many investment managers integrate ESG criteria in their
investment process (van Duuren, Plantinga, & Scholtens, 2016) and
are also more willing to use their voting rights to have an impact on
the investee's management. Thus, investment advisors, hedge funds,
and mutual funds who typically have high ownership shares could use
these voting rights to improve the corporate emission management.
Furthermore, as mentioned above, there are a lot of state-owned
firms in carbon-intensive industries. Therefore, we also expect gov-
ernmental agencies to hold a high percentage of outstanding shares
of carbon-intensive stocks in their portfolio.
Finally, we also examine how the overall universe of carbon-
intensive stocks is distributed between investors types. Hedge funds,
mutual funds, and investment advisors have the highest investment
volume and should therefore on average hold a higher proportion of
all potential shares. Government agencies, on the other hand, have a
low investment volume and tend to hold specific companies rather
than a broad portfolio. We, therefore, expect that hedge funds,
mutual funds, and investment advisors do hold the highest share of
the market capitalization of all carbon-intensive stocks in our sample.
The carbon-intensive holdings of governmental agencies should
mainly come from selected investments and therefore the ownership
of carbon-intensive stocks concerning the overall stock universe
should be rather small.
Overall, this study contributes to the analysis of ownership and
carbon risk by examining which type of investors are most exposed to
this type of risk within their portfolios, who has the highest level of
ownership in carbon-intensive stocks and thus the highest voting
rights and, finally, who holds the largest share of carbon risk when the
entire market is considered.
3 | IDENTIFICATION OF CARBON-
INTENSIVE FIRMS
In our main analysis, we use a portfolio-based approach to determine
the extent to which investor types are exposed to carbon risk. This
involves aggregating carbon risks to which firms in a portfolio are
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exposed to at the level of the investor or investor type. Accordingly,
the firm-specific carbon measures form the basis of our calculations.
This bottom-up approach, therefore, requires the identification of
carbon-intensive firms as a first step. So far, academic research has
not contributed much to help investors to manage the complexity of
identifying an asset's exposure to carbon risk. However, the Portfolio
Carbon Initiative (PCI, 2020) set up by the United Nations Environ-
ment Finance Initiative (UNEP FI) develops a rather practical frame-
work and argues that carbon risk does not only comprise quantifiable
but also non-quantifiable components. In our study, we aim to gather
a comprehensive picture of a firm's exposure to carbon risk, by includ-
ing both quantitative and qualitative aspects. Therefore, we define
three metrics to classify carbon-intensive stocks: an industry-based
carbon risk definition, the carbon footprint of a firm, and a measure
based on a carbon emission-related score.
3.1 | Industry-based carbon risk definition
(industry affiliation)
To break down the complexity of identifying carbon risk exposure, we
start with the most intuitive approach. We use the Thomson Reuters
Business Classification (TRBC, 2020) to classify all stocks based on
their industry affiliation. This seems reasonable, given that sectors are
affected differently by the transformation into a carbon-constrained
world (Labatt & White, 2002). This method has also been used by
Gallego-Alvarez et al. (2015) and Misani and Pogutz (2015) to select
GHG sensitive firms. The sector that is typically considered the most
sensitive to carbon risk is the energy industry, including oil, gas, coal,
and power utilities,2 see, for example, Lewandowski (2017).
However, firms that belong to energy-intensive industries such as
chemicals, iron, steel, cement, and metallurgy3 are also expected to be
significantly affected by carbon risk. These basic resources companies
typically have a high consumption of fossil fuels (Dell'Aringa & van
Ast, 2009). Besides direct CO2 emissions, the amount of carbon emit-
ted during downstream activities is also relevant. Therefore, we also
classify producers and users of energy-consuming products, that is,
the automobile and transportation industry4 as carbon-intensive.
Firms within these industries are very vulnerable, especially to tech-
nology risk (e.g., fuel efficiency) as pointed out by Labatt and
White (2007) and Goodstein (2011).
Additionally, we include the sector “Paper and Forest Products”
into the list of CO2-heavy industries. This takes into account that
deforestation does not only lead to releases of CO2 stored in the ter-
restrial biosphere, but also reduces the ability to absorb emitted
greenhouse gases (IPCC, 2014). Hence, the industry also has the
potential to worsen global warming and is subject to potential regula-
tory actions. This leaves us with 15 carbon-intensive industries that
are presented inTable 1.
3.2 | Carbon footprint
By simply using the industry affiliation as a classification scheme, all
companies that belong to one of the 15 carbon-intensive industries
will be characterized as having high exposure to carbon risk. However,
not all companies within the same industry will face the same level of
carbon risk, as they emit different amounts of CO2.
To achieve a more precise distinction, we, therefore, follow Hoff-
mann and Busch (2008) and additionally compute a firm's carbon foot-
print. The carbon footprint is defined as a firm's total CO2 emissions
5
standardized by some proxy of size. In line with Saka and
Oshika (2014), Kim et al. (2015), Misani and Pogutz (2015), we use
the market capitalization (market caps,t) in U.S. dollar as proxy
6 to gain





2Corresponding to theThomson Reuters industry groups oil and gas, oil and gas related
equipment and services, natural gas utilities, coal, electric utilities and IPPs, and multiline
utilities.
3Corresponding to theThomson Reuters industry groups chemicals, metals and mining and
construction materials.
4Corresponding to theThomson Reuters industry groups aerospace and defense, automobile
and parts, freight and logistics services, passenger transportation, and transport
infrastructure.

























Paper and forest products
Note: This table includes 14 industries from three categories that are most
sensitive to carbon risk. In addition to the sectors provided, we also
include the “Paper & Forest Products” industry into the list of
CO2-intensive industries. Every firm in Asset4 that belongs to one of these
15 industries is categorized as carbon-intensive in our analysis.
5To overcome the problem of an imperfect time series, we calculate the averages of all
normalized CO2 emissions from 2008 to 2015 for each firm. Working with a limited period
allows us to create a static sample of CO2 heavy firms, which can be analyzed over time.
Thereby we assume that the average behavior is representative for the whole time period of
2000–2015. We exclude companies without any emission data.
6We also standardize carbon emissions by using total net assets as well as sales of a
company, instead of using market capitalization. Results for these conducted robustness
checks suggest that our main findings on carbon risk exposure and investor ownership were
not affected by the way we calculate the carbon footprint of a company. Therefore, the
additional results are not reported in this paper but are available upon request to the authors.
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Hereby, carbon emissionss,t include CO2 emissions from Scope 1 (emis-
sions from sources directly owned and controlled by the firm) and
Scope 2 (indirect emissions from the generation of purchased electric-
ity) for each firm s in year t. We neglect Scope 3 emissions (all other
indirect emissions, not controlled by the firm) in line with previous
studies (e.g., Lewandowski, 2017; Misani & Pogutz, 2015), due to the
lack of data availability and data quality (CarbonTrust, 2018).
It is important to note that few regulatory bodies require manda-
tory GHG disclosure, while disclosure requirements are typically
imposed only on companies with specific features. As a result, the
coverage of total CO2 emissions data is sparse, especially in the early
2000s. However, Figure 1 shows that lately coverage has increased
significantly. In 2015, around 50% of all companies from carbon-
intensive industries provide data for total CO2 emissions.
To further differentiate carbon-intensive stocks, we use a “worst-
in-class” approach; that is, we rank all companies within each carbon-
intensive industry based on their carbon footprint (Labatt &
White, 2002). Firms with carbon footprints in the highest 50% of each
industry are then classified as “worst emitters.”7
3.3 | Emission scoring
Earlier academic studies have mainly neglected the fact that a firm's
carbon risk exposure is not solely a question of its quantifiable carbon
footprint. If a firm wants to reduce its risk, cutting down carbon emis-
sions is only one step. We additionally identify firms with high carbon
risk exposure by applying an emission-related score. For this study,
we use the emission-score (e-score), a subscore from the environmen-
tal pillar of the Refinitiv Asset4 ESG database.8 Within the environ-
mental pillar, companies are classified according to their resource
usage and degree of environmental innovation, as well as their efforts
to reduce emissions. According to Refinitiv (2020), the e-score “mea-
sures a company's commitment and effectiveness towards reducing
environmental emissions in the production and operational pro-
cesses.” This allows us to offer a more comprehensive and future-
oriented picture of how a firm deals with carbon risk exposure, which
also includes qualitative factors.
As indicated in Figure 1, e-score coverage at the beginning of the
sample period is rather sparse, while in recent years, the score is avail-
able for a relatively high share of companies. In the first step, for each
firm, we calculate the average of all reported e-scores between 2008
and 2015. We then rank all firms within each of the industries and
classify the lowest 50% in each industry as the worst e-score
emitters.
4 | METHODOLOGY
According to the dual function as a portfolio manager and partial
owner, we analyze an investor's carbon risk from both perspectives.
First, we examine the extent to which the respective portfolio values
are determined by investments in carbon-intensive companies, thus
providing information on the exposure of assets under management
to the inherent carbon risk of these companies. And second, we inves-
tigate the ownership structure of carbon-intensive companies to
determine which investors are the major shareholders and thus the
main risk-takers.
4.1 | Carbon risk exposure
To measure the portfolio-related carbon risk for each investor type,
namely, institutional investors, hedge funds, individuals, government
agencies, investment advisors, and mutual funds, we compute the car-




s2 PDS+NDSi,tð Þvalue heldi,s,t
, ð2Þ
where s ϵPDSi,t describes all “dirty,” that is, carbon-intensive, stocks (DS)
in portfolio P of investor i in year t. Analogously, s ϵ PDS+NDSi,t
 
describes all stocks, that is, dirty and non-dirty stocks (NDS), in the
investor's portfolio. The U.S. dollar value of stock s held by the inves-
tor is denoted by value heldi,s,t. Accordingly, the CREi,t can be inter-
preted as the fraction of carbon-intensive investments of the total
portfolio value—the higher the CREi,t, the more exposed the investor
is to carbon risk. To enable the comparison between different investor






s2 PDS+NDSi,tð Þvalue heldi,s,t
ð3Þ
F IGURE 1 Available CO2 emission reportings
and e-scores. The number (left y-axis) and the
percentage (right y-axis) of firms from carbon-
intensive industries with available CO2-emission
reportings or emission scores from 2000 to 2015
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where i 2 Oj describes the affiliation of investor i to respective owner
type j. Consequently, aggr. CREj,t represents the carbon risk exposure
of the aggregated portfolios of the respective investor type. An aggr.
CREj,t of 0.3, therefore, indicates that all investors of owner type j (e.-
g. all hedge funds) have 30% of their total assets invested in carbon-
intensive stocks.
To rule out passive investment behavior and a consequential
indifference to carbon risk, in the next step we compute the carbon
risk exposure of each investor in excess to the carbon risk exposure
of the entire Asset4 market portfolio. Our measure for excess carbon






Subsequently, we test each year and for each investor type whether
the average carbon risk exposure of the associated investors i is equal
to the carbon risk exposure of the entire Asset4 universe.
4.2 | Ownership of carbon-intensive stocks
To examine the ownership structure of carbon-intensive companies,
we first determine the average ownership share in a carbon-intensive
















where i 2 Oj contains all investors i that belong to owner type j and
NDSj,t denotes the number of stocks held by owner type j at time t.
Therefore, a value of 0.25 for ownershipsharesj,t means that owner type
j owns on average one quarter of the shares outstanding of the
carbon-intensive stocks in its portfolio P. By focusing exclusively on
the companies held in the respective owner type portfolio, this mea-
sure reflects the potential of an owner type to influence corporate
decisions according to its risk preference, for example, in a vote on a
specifically submitted shareholder proposal.
It should be noted that ownershipsharesj,t does not take into account
that some of the carbon-intensive companies might be completely
ignored by the different owner types. To illustrate this difference,
imagine a universe with 100 carbon-intensive stocks. If hedge funds
only invest in one of these companies (e.g., with ownership = 100%),
ownershipsharesj,t correctly detects that the hedge funds possess 100%
of the carbon-intensive stocks in their portfolio. However, it does not
take into account that there are 99 additional carbon-intensive com-
panies in which their share is 0%.
In the following, we consider the entire carbon-intensive stock
universe potentially available for purchase to gain an insight into the
distribution of ownership among owner types. Accordingly, we put
the aggregated value held of carbon-intensive stocks of each owner
type in relation to the total market capitalization of all carbon-








where s 2 DSt contains all stocks in the carbon-intensive stocks avail-
able in the Asset4 universe at time t. Thus, a value of 0.25 for
ownershipvaluej,t indicates that owner type j (e.g., hedge funds) owns
25% of the aggregated value of carbon-intensive companies in the
entire Asset4 universe.
4.3 | Regression analysis
In the previous subsection, we introduced measures for a univariate
examination of the ownership structure of carbon-intensive firms. To
make a reliable assessment of whether an investor type has a prefer-
ence for or an aversion against carbon-intensive equity holdings, we
include a firm's carbon intensity alongside firm characteristics that are
focused on the traditional investment decision-making process to
explain the variation in ownership shares per investor type.
In particular, we estimate the relationship between the firm's car-
bon intensity and the ownership share of each investor type, using
the following regression model:




βu controlsi,t + τ + λ+ εi,t,
ð7Þ
where the independent variable ownershipsharesj,s,t denotes the ownership
share of investor type j in firm s at the end of year t. The binary vari-
able carbon¯ intensives,t indicates whether the firm is identified as
carbon-intensive (1) or non-carbon-intensive (0). A coefficient esti-
mate βj with a positive (negative) sign, therefore, reflects a preference
(aversion) of respective investor type j towards carbon-intensive firms.
We control for a set of firm-level variables (controlsi,t) as well as for
year (τ) and country (λ) fixed effects. As firm-level control variables,
we include firm size, financial performance, leverage, and asset tangi-
bility. Among others, Duggal and Millar (1999) reveal that firm size,
due to legal and liquidity reasons, predicts institutional ownership.
We, therefore, consider firm size as the natural logarithm of market
capitalization. To capture the impact of financial performance, we fol-
low Dyck et al. (2019) and include Tobin's Q and a firm's annual stock
8Note that in the second half of 2018, the Financial and Risk Business of Thomson Reuters
was renamed Refinitiv, after a strategic partnership transaction betweenThomson Reuters
and private equity funds managed by Blackstone. As a result of the renaming, Refinitiv also
now refers to the former Asset4 ESG database as ESG data. Given that the data used in our
analysis (as well as the documentation for the data) were sourced before the renaming, in the
following, we will typically refer to Asset4.
8Note that in the second half of 2018, the Financial and Risk Business of Thomson Reuters
was renamed Refinitiv, after a strategic partnership transaction betweenThomson Reuters
and private equity funds managed by Blackstone. As a result of the renaming, Refinitiv also
now refers to the former Asset4 ESG database as ESG data. Given that the data used in our
analysis (as well as the documentation for the data) were sourced before the renaming, in the
following, we will typically refer to Asset4.
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return. Grier and Zychowicz (1994) observe a negative relationship
between debt and the ownership share of institutional investors, justi-
fying this by the closer monitoring by creditors, which reduces the
need for institutional monitoring. To capture this effect, we include
the commonly used control variables leverage (as the ratio of total
debt to common equity) and asset tangibility (as the ratio of total fixed
assets to total assets). Lastly, we control for year- and country-specific
variation of investor types' ownership shares (e.g., due to varying legal
frameworks) and estimate robust standard errors according to
White (1980).
5 | DATA AND SUMMARY STATISTICS
5.1 | Firms with high carbon risk exposure
We obtain data on CO2 emissions and e-scores from the Refinitiv
Asset4 ESG database. The database covers the most important shares
traded on global stock markets9 and, therefore, serves as a good proxy
for the worldwide investment universe. Data on market capitalization,
common shares outstanding, stock returns, Tobin's Q, assets tangibil-
ity, leverage, and industry affiliation are sourced from Thomson
Reuters Datastream.
Since Asset4 obtains its CO2 data, inter alia, from the Carbon Dis-
closure Project, we have to work with voluntarily reported data, which
might be unreliable, inconsistent, and not validated by a third party,
according to Calvello (2009). Furthermore, it also poses the risk of a
self-selection bias, where, for example, bad environmental performers
consciously do not report emissions to minimize their reputational
risks. However, due to the lack of mandatory ESG disclosure, these
weaknesses cannot be ruled out even with an alternative data pro-
vider. Asset4 offers comparatively broad coverage (Escrig-Olmedo,
Fernández-Izquierdo, Ferrero-Ferrero, Rivera-Lirio, & Muñoz-Torres,
2019) and is used in several studies, for example, Matsumura, Prakash,
and Vera-Muñoz (2014) and Lewandowski (2017). We, therefore, rely
on the data available from Asset4, while acknowledging the potential
limitations of this dataset.
Out of the full sample of 3,353 firms or 41,687 firm-years, we
obtain 954 firms from carbon-intensive industries that have been
active for the entire sample period 2000 to 2015. Companies that
have entered the stock market later or have been delisted due to
mergers or bankruptcy are excluded. By doing so, we create an Asset4
universe in which investors could, theoretically, have been invested in
any share at any time of the considered sample period. For the other
two definitions of carbon-intensive firms, due to the smaller coverage
of available data, we have 312 firms ranked as worst emitters based
on their carbon footprint and 452 firms categorized as “worst e-Score
based emitters.”
An overview of the industry and country distribution of these
subsamples is presented in Table 2. Panel B illustrates that with
254 carbon-intensive companies, or almost one third of the market
capitalization of all carbon-intensive companies, the United States has
the highest share of polluting companies. This is also true for the
“worst in class” classification of CO2 heavy companies based on their
emission score, where 130 out of 452 companies are based in the
United States. Panel C illustrates that the polluting industries are typi-
cally Oil and Gas, Chemicals, and Metals and Mining. Our summary
also shows that the selected 954 carbon-intensive stocks correspond
to approximately 26% of the total market capitalization of all Asset4
firms in the sample. Stocks identified as having the worst carbon foot-
print or the worst emission score correspond to approximately 11%
(4%) of the total market capitalization of the Asset4 universe.
5.2 | Ownership holdings
Our data on ownership structure are sourced from the Thomson
Reuters' Global Equity Ownership database. We use year-end owner-
ship information for 3,135 distinct firms with available Asset4 data.
On average, we observe 12,698 distinct investors from 2000 to 2015,
which we categorize into six investor types: institutional investors
(including banks, trusts, insurances, pension as well as endowment
funds, and foundations), hedge funds, mutual funds, and investment
advisors, as well as individuals and government agencies.
Table 3 shows the distribution of held companies among the dif-
ferent types of investors. The average value held by all investors adds
up to 12 trillion USD, which corresponds to a coverage of 42% of the
total Asset4 market capitalization. Both Investment Advisors and
Hedge Funds hold around one sixth of this value and form the largest
investor groups, while governments and individuals are the least
potent investor types, accounting for 1.17% and 1.97% of the total
market capitalization of the Asset4 universe.
6 | RESULTS
6.1 | The exposure of investors' portfolio values to
carbon risks
Table 4 illustrates the development of aggr. CREj,t for the various
investor types over time. Interestingly, the most noteworthy disparity
in investment preferences among the different investor types can be
observed in government agencies and individual investors. We first
consider the results that are based on an industry-based definition of
the companies, that is, carbon risk exposure for carbon-intensive
stocks from CO2-intensive industries in panel A. The results show that
between 2000 and 2015, an average of 49% of the portfolio value of
government agencies consists of carbon-intensive assets, ranging
from 35% in 2004 to a maximum of 65% in 2011. By contrast, the car-
bon risk exposure of individual investors is relatively low, with an
average of approximately 15%, while the remaining investor types
typically hold similar shares of carbon-intensive stocks between 20%
and 25% on average. Table 4 further reveals that carbon risk exposure
9MSCI Emerging Markets, MSCI World, CAC40, DAX, FTSE250, S&P 500, NASDAQ
100, STOXX 600, ASX 300, SMI, and Bovespa.
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TABLE 2 Firm-level summary statistics
Panel A: Summary statistics
Variable N Mean Median p5 p95
Firm size (Tsd. $) 41,687 8,470,000 2,530,000 163,000 37,300,000
Stock return 41,687 0.15 0.11 −0.52 0.97
Tobin's Q 41,687 1.38 1.04 0.25 3.72
Leverage 41,687 1.06 0.55 0.00 3.97
Asset tangibility 41,687 0.43 0.41 0.07 0.87
Panel B: Distribution of carbon-intensive firms by country
Country Industry affiliation Worst carbon footprint Worst emission score
Number of
firms








% market cap. of all
dirty stocks
Australia 82 2.88% 13 1.64% 51 2.62%
Brazil 6 1.50% 1 1.66% 2 0.96%
Canada 101 5.25% 21 4.41% 65 6.92%
Chile 9 0.65% 3 0.24% 4 1.23%
China 34 2.05% 5 0.50% 23 6.04%
European
Union
166 28.57% 72 39.16% 46 10.10%
India 27 2.04% 12 2.47% 9 1.34%
Indonesia 8 0.36% 4 0.56% 3 1.23%
Japan 108 12.07% 58 10.40% 43 20.07%
Korea 23 1.68% 11 2.12% 8 1.24%
Malaysia 12 0.61% 7 0.86% 8 2.56%
Mexico 6 0.45% 1 0.38% 2 0.20%
New Zealand 11 0.14% 1 0.03% 6 0.32%
Norway 9 0.40% 3 0.61% 4 0.60%
Others 14 1.53% 2 2.03% 10 2.28%
Russia 4 2.35% 1 2.97% 0 0.00%
Singapore 8 0.47% 1 0.36% 4 1.08%
South Africa 24 1.17% 16 2.31% 7 0.39%
Switzerland 11 1.26% 1 0.52% 2 0.70%
Taiwan 25 0.99% 12 1.32% 21 5.05%
Thailand 6 0.24% 2 0.11% 1 0.12%
Turkey 6 0.21% 1 0.14% 3 0.54%
United States 254 33.14% 64 25.20% 130 34.42%
Total 954 100.00% 312 100.00% 452 100.00%
Panel C: Distribution of carbon-intensive firms by industry
Industry
Industry affiliation Worst carbon footprint Worst emission score
Number of
firms












45 5.97% 14 5.93% 20 5.03%
Automobiles and auto
parts
95 12.11% 34 8.94% 45 13.42%
Chemicals 113 8.26% 41 8.83% 53 12.15%
Coal 13 0.28% 2 0.05% 6 0.50%
33 1.96% 13 2.52% 17 3.22%
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is more volatile in the portfolio of governmental agencies in compari-
son with the remaining investor types. This could be due to the
smaller number of firms in the portfolios of government agencies,
who are rather invested in selected firms and do not have a widely
diversified portfolio.
For most types of investors, the carbon risk in their portfolio
increases from 2000 and peaks in 2011. From 2012, we observe a
change in investment behavior as the proportion of carbon-intensive
stocks in investors' portfolios declines. One explanation for this could
be the growing social awareness of climate risks associated with CO2
emissions and the resulting pressure on investors in carbon-intensive
companies, which, for example, resulted in the establishment of the
PDC in 2014. Given the Paris Agreement in 2015, this trend towards
decarbonization can be expected to continue in the future.
TABLE 2 (Continued)
Panel C: Distribution of carbon-intensive firms by industry
Industry
Industry affiliation Worst carbon footprint Worst emission score
Number of
firms














80 10.72% 34 11.19% 39 19.17%
Freight and logistics
Svcs.
61 4.81% 16 5.19% 30 4.76%
Metals and mining 176 10.85% 50 12.23% 83 7.49%
Multiline utilities 27 2.51% 11 2.77% 13 3.75%
Natural gas utilities 26 1.43% 6 1.13% 12 2.25%
Oil and gas 131 31.49% 44 33.57% 63 10.26%
Oil and gas equipment
and Svcs.
60 4.45% 15 3.65% 27 5.30%
Paper and forest
products
18 0.65% 6 0.66% 8 0.70%
Passenger
transportation Svcs.
48 3.35% 17 2.56% 23 9.98%
Transport
infrastructure
28 1.18% 9 0.77% 13 2.03%




% of total Asset4
market cap.
26.00% 10.97% 4.02%
Note: Panel A contains summary statistics for firm-level controls for the entire sample of 41,687 firm years. Panels B and C include the number of
carbon-intensive stocks and their proportion of the market capitalization of all carbon-intensive stocks, which are covered in the subsample after selecting
954 Asset4 companies that belong to the 15 most CO2-sensitive industries and after applying the “worst-in-class” approach for carbon and emission scor-
ing. Panel B shows the geographical distribution of these companies, and Panel C shows the distribution among the considered carbon-intensive industries.
All variables are defined as described in the text.
TABLE 3 Comparison of different investor types
Institutionals Hedge funds Individuals Governments Investment advisors Mutual funds All investors
Number of investors 594 1,464 7,309 42 1,923 1,366 12,698
Number of held firms 2,786 3,053 1,092 91 2,232 3,031 3,135
Value held (bn $) 1,177 4,423 577 336 4,522 928 11,963
% of Asset4 market cap. 4.16% 15.27% 1.97% 1.17% 15.81% 3.15% 41.52%
Note: This table shows the number of investors, the number of companies held, the value held, and the corresponding percentage of the total market capi-
talization of the Asset4 universe. The statistics are presented as an average based on the year-end data between 2000 and 2015 for each investor type.
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TABLE 4 Aggregated carbon risk exposure in different investor portfolios
Panel A: Firms from carbon-intensive industries
Year Institutionals Hedge funds Individuals Governments Investment advisors Mutual funds All investors
2000 13.27% 15.13% 10.97% 36.53% 14.95% 15.48% 15.43%
2001 14.14% 15.81% 7.64% 55.36% 14.97% 18.77% 15.94%
2002 16.56% 18.14% 12.78% 45.29% 16.55% 22.83% 18.07%
2003 16.59% 17.46% 13.21% 40.55% 16.47% 22.66% 17.72%
2004 18.30% 20.07% 12.13% 35.07% 18.82% 24.19% 19.65%
2005 20.97% 22.36% 14.18% 47.33% 21.71% 28.18% 22.48%
2006 23.02% 23.10% 14.45% 42.41% 22.39% 26.46% 23.08%
2007 26.52% 28.08% 15.87% 60.43% 26.65% 27.71% 27.83%
2008 26.02% 26.83% 15.42% 54.15% 25.85% 26.30% 26.73%
2009 26.43% 25.80% 16.04% 56.75% 25.32% 27.42% 26.59%
2010 27.72% 26.91% 19.85% 53.95% 26.33% 27.19% 27.55%
2011 26.58% 26.78% 17.28% 65.49% 26.39% 27.45% 27.43%
2012 24.29% 24.61% 18.18% 50.16% 23.98% 25.94% 24.78%
2013 24.14% 23.56% 19.98% 56.69% 22.55% 24.59% 23.98%
2014 22.40% 21.87% 18.93% 51.34% 21.23% 22.87% 22.33%
2015 19.71% 19.69% 17.35% 39.67% 18.96% 21.42% 19.88%
Mean 21.67% 22.26% 15.27% 49.45% 21.44% 24.34% 22.47%
Median 22.71% 22.73% 15.64% 50.75% 22.05% 25.26% 22.78%
Std. deviation 4.58% 4.04% 3.29% 8.60% 4.06% 3.44% 4.12%
Min 13.27% 15.13% 7.64% 35.07% 14.95% 15.48% 15.43%
Max 27.72% 28.08% 19.98% 65.49% 26.65% 28.18% 27.83%
Panel B: Stocks with worst carbon footprint ranking
Year Institutionals Hedge funds Individuals Governments Investment advisors Mutual funds All investors
2000 5.15% 6.58% 4.52% 20.53% 6.01% 6.68% 6.58%
2001 5.34% 6.88% 2.86% 33.96% 5.94% 8.38% 6.79%
2002 6.39% 7.80% 2.45% 29.12% 6.53% 9.69% 7.55%
2003 6.06% 7.18% 3.26% 27.86% 6.42% 9.78% 7.29%
2004 6.49% 8.25% 2.26% 18.94% 7.31% 10.53% 7.82%
2005 7.79% 9.17% 2.91% 29.92% 8.75% 12.04% 9.20%
2006 8.33% 9.16% 1.98% 17.57% 8.68% 12.43% 8.97%
2007 9.81% 11.12% 3.42% 26.20% 10.13% 12.81% 10.92%
2008 9.32% 9.79% 2.75% 26.01% 9.08% 11.28% 9.82%
2009 10.17% 9.52% 3.29% 30.39% 9.18% 11.72% 10.17%
2010 10.26% 9.45% 4.77% 27.28% 9.69% 11.66% 10.29%
2011 9.96% 9.13% 3.48% 37.62% 9.09% 11.38% 10.00%
2012 9.41% 8.62% 3.65% 29.75% 8.15% 10.80% 8.99%
2013 9.12% 8.15% 3.95% 31.08% 7.75% 10.00% 8.61%
2014 8.81% 8.08% 4.23% 23.54% 7.97% 8.55% 8.34%
2015 7.73% 7.22% 4.00% 19.48% 7.21% 7.50% 7.40%
Mean 8.13% 8.51% 3.36% 26.83% 7.99% 10.33% 8.67%
Median 8.57% 8.43% 3.36% 27.57% 8.06% 10.66% 8.79%
Std. deviation 1.70% 1.18% 0.78% 5.46% 1.28% 1.74% 1.30%
Min 5.15% 6.58% 1.98% 17.57% 5.94% 6.68% 6.58%
Max 10.26% 11.12% 4.77% 37.62% 10.13% 12.81% 10.92%
292 BENZ ET AL.
In panels B and C, the exposure to carbon-intensive stocks is
further disentangled by examining investments into the “dirtiest”
stocks within the carbon-intensive stock category. For this purpose,
the worst emitters are defined as the 50% of companies with the
highest carbon footprints (panel B) or the 50% of companies with
the worst emission scores (panel C). While panel B confirms the rel-
atively high carbon risk exposure of governments, panel C shows a
more homogeneous exposure of the individual owner types.
To draw inferences as to whether the different carbon risk expo-
sures of each type of investor are based on corresponding prefer-
ences, we use the carbon risk exposure of the overall market as a
benchmark. A significant deviation, therefore, indicates an active over-
weighting or underweighting of carbon-intensive stock holdings.10
Table 5 presents the carbon risk in excess to the carbon risk exposure
of the Asset4 market portfolio (ex. CREi,t). The high carbon risk expo-
sure of government agencies is confirmed by significant values
between 20 and more than 30 percentage points (pp) in excess to the
exposure of the Asset4 market portfolio. Interestingly, except for
mutual funds, all other types of investors tend to avoid carbon risk in
the allocation of their portfolios compared to the market-inherent
exposure (each significant at the 1% level).
6.2 | The ownership structure of carbon-
intensive firms
Hereafter, we focus on the ownership level of the different investor
types regarding carbon-intensive stocks. The level of ownership
shares indicates the balance of power between various types of inves-
tors and determines the prospects of a forced change in corporate
policy direction, for example, in a vote on a shareholder proposal to
reduce emissions.
Table 6 illustrates the average ownership of a carbon-intensive
stock in the portfolio of the respective owner types as defined in10Statistical significance is measured by one sample t tests against zero.
TABLE 4 (Continued)
Panel C: Stocks with worst e-score ranking
Year Institutionals Hedge funds Individuals Governments Investment advisors Mutual funds All investors
Panel C: Stocks with worst e-score ranking
Year Institutionals Hedge funds Individuals Governments Investment advisors Mutual funds All investors
2000 2.10% 2.00% 3.38% 0.03% 1.80% 1.21% 1.86%
2001 2.09% 2.16% 2.23% 0.28% 1.94% 1.40% 1.97%
2002 1.93% 2.30% 2.74% 1.63% 1.96% 2.09% 2.11%
2003 2.00% 2.46% 4.05% 0.94% 2.28% 2.25% 2.35%
2004 2.43% 2.94% 2.33% 1.69% 2.78% 2.68% 2.75%
2005 2.67% 3.24% 3.44% 1.56% 2.94% 2.77% 3.01%
2006 3.00% 3.26% 3.07% 1.20% 2.91% 2.89% 3.02%
2007 3.59% 3.70% 3.45% 0.31% 3.29% 3.77% 3.43%
2008 3.09% 3.11% 3.61% 1.64% 3.06% 3.40% 3.09%
2009 3.57% 3.34% 3.53% 1.24% 3.36% 3.60% 3.31%
2010 3.51% 4.07% 5.97% 1.20% 3.79% 4.59% 3.94%
2011 3.49% 4.45% 5.04% 3.54% 4.07% 4.70% 4.23%
2012 3.45% 4.34% 5.01% 3.50% 3.94% 4.69% 4.15%
2013 3.47% 4.52% 5.55% 3.40% 4.20% 4.49% 4.33%
2014 3.26% 4.30% 5.41% 2.58% 3.88% 4.67% 4.08%
2015 2.86% 3.77% 5.57% 1.96% 3.39% 4.22% 3.63%
Mean 2.91% 3.37% 4.02% 1.67% 3.10% 3.34% 3.20%
Median 3.05% 3.30% 3.57% 1.59% 3.17% 3.50% 3.20%
Std. deviation 0.60% 0.82% 1.19% 1.07% 0.76% 1.16% 0.80%
Min 1.93% 2.00% 2.23% 0.03% 1.80% 1.21% 1.86%
Max 3.59% 4.52% 5.97% 3.54% 4.20% 4.70% 4.33%
Note: The table illustrates the development of the aggregated carbon risk exposure (aggr. CREj,t) for each of the investor types over time. Results in each
panel vary due to the different categories of carbon-intensive stocks. Panel A represents the results for the carbon-intensive stocks from the
carbon-intensive industries. Panel B represents the results for the worst emitters according to the ranking of their carbon footprint. Panel C represents the
results for the worst emitters according to the ranking of their e-score.
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Equation 5. Our expectations regarding the ownership structure are
being met: while institutional and individual investors play a relatively
minor but still evident role in terms of the ownership distribution, the
significance of government agencies is once again evident. On aver-
age, government agencies hold around 27% of outstanding shares of a
carbon-intensive stock in their portfolio. The main driver is probably
the high occurrence of state-ownership within CO2 heavy sectors.
This hypothesis is supported by a report of the OECD (2014), which
shows that electricity and gas is one of the most dominant sectors
among state-owned listed entities. As expected, hedge funds and
investment advisors are also relevant shareholder groups with average
ownership of 13% and 18%, respectively. Overall, our results suggest
that these three types of investors in particular could influence envi-
ronmental awareness and the behavior of carbon-intensive companies
in which they are invested, due to their high level of ownership.
To draw inferences about the total exposure to carbon risk for
investors, in the following, we consider the entire universe of CO2-
intensive stocks. Table 7 reports how the ownership of carbon-
intensive stocks as defined in Equation 6 is distributed among the dif-
ferent types of investors. Our results illustrate that investment advi-
sors and hedge funds are the strongest owner groups, each holding
around 13% of the market capitalization of all carbon-intensive stocks
in our sample. In contrast to the previous analysis, government agen-
cies play a subordinate role from this perspective: only about 2% of
the market capitalization of all carbon-intensive companies are owned
by governments. Overall, we see their role as a carbon risk-taker
mainly stemming from state-ownership of selected carbon-intensive
firms and less through broadly based investments. In total, Table 7
reveals that hedge funds and investment advisors hold the highest
proportion of the “carbon risk bomb.” This might not only be interest-
ing for clients of these investors, but also for policymakers, who are
thinking of controlling the sponsors of carbon-intensive companies. It
also highlights the relevance of some of these investor groups' volun-
tary commitments11 to tackle climate change by decarbonizing their
portfolios.
6.3 | Investor preferences towards carbon-
intensive firms
To substantiate the conclusions, we draw about an investor type's
preference for carbon-intensive companies, we use a multivariate
regression model to investigate the relationship between the owner-
ship structure and the carbon intensity of a firm.
Table 8 presents pairwise correlations for dependent, explana-
tory, and control variables adopted in estimating the relationship
between ownership share and carbon intensity. All variables of
TABLE 5 Excess carbon risk exposure in different investor portfolios
Year Institutionals Hedge funds Individuals Governments Investment advisors Mutual funds All investors
2000 −1.56* 0.09 −2.42*** 25.67*** −2.04*** 1.61*** −1.17***
2001 −2.49*** −1.65** −0.34 34.78*** −3.87*** 1.28** −0.98***
2002 −1.04 −0.42 −3.47*** 26.34*** −4.71*** 3.15*** −2.03***
2003 −0.36 −0.82 −1.96*** 31.32*** −3.50*** 3.27*** −1.25***
2004 −2.82*** 0.07 −3.70*** 31.16*** −3.15*** 2.11*** −2.28***
2005 −2.15** 0.88 −4.69*** 23.48*** −4.65*** 1.10* −3.16***
2006 −4.16*** −1.03* −4.52*** 26.72*** −5.55*** 1.19** −3.50***
2007 −4.32*** −1.72*** −8.08*** 24.94*** −4.95*** 0.10 −5.59***
2008 −2.22** −2.01*** −6.61*** 21.01*** −4.80*** 0.20 −4.91***
2009 −2.23** −3.66*** −7.39*** 20.29*** −5.70*** 0.79 −5.70***
2010 −2.70*** −1.40** −6.76*** 20.06*** −5.68*** −0.83 −5.19***
2011 −1.35 −1.65*** −6.14*** 19.90*** −3.62*** 1.22** −4.26***
2012 0.55 −2.37*** −1.81*** 23.28*** −3.00*** 1.01** −1.57***
2013 2.08* −0.38 −0.11 28.06*** −2.22*** 0.76* −0.19
2014 4.62*** −0.49 3.71*** 31.45*** −1.63*** 1.61*** 2.28***
2015 4.72*** −1.41*** 1.47*** 29.80*** −1.91*** 2.51*** 0.98***
All years −0.98*** −1.20*** −3.26*** 25.58*** −3.70*** 1.27*** −2.40***
Note: For each year and investor group, the following table shows their average carbon risk exposure in excess of the carbon risk exposure of the overall
Asset4 market (ex. CREi,t). Statistical significance is measured by one sample t tests against zero.
*Statistical significance at the 10% level.
**Statistical significance at the 5% level.
***Statistical significance at the 1% level.
11For example, the “The Global Investor Statement on Climate Change,” which was facilitated
by the UNEP FI.
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TABLE 6 Carbon stock ownership of the different investor types
Panel A: Stocks from carbon-intensive industries
Year Institutionals Hedge funds Individuals Governments Investment advisors Mutual funds All investors
2000 3.20% 9.29% 9.29% 25.25% 12.14% 2.21% 20.54%
2001 3.04% 9.77% 9.26% 27.90% 16.80% 2.50% 21.17%
2002 3.37% 10.64% 9.42% 21.94% 15.79% 2.61% 23.03%
2003 3.34% 10.98% 8.79% 21.24% 16.05% 2.72% 24.90%
2004 3.00% 12.06% 7.64% 19.84% 16.73% 2.48% 25.91%
2005 3.05% 12.62% 8.21% 24.25% 17.24% 2.42% 27.86%
2006 3.29% 13.45% 7.27% 22.81% 17.71% 2.52% 29.89%
2007 3.14% 14.90% 7.08% 27.35% 16.64% 3.88% 33.39%
2008 2.75% 13.30% 6.26% 29.36% 19.07% 3.18% 31.63%
2009 3.10% 13.28% 6.53% 30.87% 18.58% 2.97% 32.18%
2010 3.04% 13.72% 6.59% 33.31% 17.58% 3.31% 32.92%
2011 3.30% 13.99% 6.12% 32.22% 18.46% 3.30% 33.38%
2012 3.22% 14.16% 6.25% 29.34% 18.52% 3.44% 33.84%
2013 3.14% 14.43% 6.13% 29.51% 19.44% 4.13% 34.93%
2014 3.42% 15.37% 5.26% 32.12% 20.24% 4.62% 36.74%
2015 3.28% 15.55% 5.50% 32.47% 21.47% 4.74% 36.95%
Mean 3.17% 12.97% 7.22% 27.49% 17.65% 3.19% 29.95%
Median 3.17% 13.37% 6.84% 28.62% 17.65% 3.07% 31.90%
Std. deviation 0.17% 1.87% 1.34% 4.26% 2.06% 0.77% 5.21%
Min 2.75% 9.29% 5.26% 19.84% 12.14% 2.21% 20.54%
Max 3.42% 15.55% 9.42% 33.31% 21.47% 4.74% 36.95%
Panel B: Stocks with worst carbon footprint ranking
Year Institutionals Hedge funds Individuals Governments Investment advisors Mutual funds All investors
2000 2.89% 7.37% 3.91% 24.37% 9.23% 2.27% 17.40%
2001 2.66% 7.50% 5.60% 18.31% 14.42% 2.70% 17.54%
2002 3.07% 8.10% 5.48% 16.06% 12.21% 2.60% 18.36%
2003 2.87% 8.36% 5.02% 11.65% 12.58% 2.72% 19.59%
2004 2.44% 9.14% 3.51% 10.37% 13.25% 2.67% 20.44%
2005 2.89% 9.69% 4.80% 13.94% 13.83% 2.47% 22.39%
2006 3.11% 10.40% 3.10% 10.92% 15.16% 2.62% 23.41%
2007 2.84% 12.10% 3.70% 18.86% 13.56% 4.15% 27.17%
2008 2.51% 10.76% 3.61% 18.13% 15.82% 3.31% 25.27%
2009 3.09% 10.83% 4.35% 24.45% 15.30% 3.13% 26.51%
2010 2.86% 10.85% 4.64% 24.87% 15.40% 3.46% 26.70%
2011 3.33% 11.02% 3.94% 24.44% 15.60% 3.36% 26.41%
2012 3.55% 11.60% 4.72% 25.66% 15.68% 3.63% 27.98%
2013 3.31% 12.07% 4.69% 26.21% 16.19% 4.16% 28.67%
2014 3.66% 12.63% 4.70% 25.89% 17.74% 4.47% 30.41%
2015 3.32% 12.91% 4.13% 28.23% 19.04% 4.45% 30.51%
Mean 3.02% 10.33% 4.37% 20.15% 14.69% 3.26% 24.30%
Median 2.98% 10.80% 4.49% 21.62% 15.23% 3.22% 25.84%
Std. deviation 0.34% 1.74% 0.69% 5.91% 2.23% 0.71% 4.35%
Min 2.44% 7.37% 3.10% 10.37% 9.23% 2.27% 17.40%
Max 3.66% 12.91% 5.60% 28.23% 19.04% 4.47% 30.51%
(Continues)
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interest, that is, the ownership shares of the investor types, exhibit a
significant correlation with carbon intensity. Here, only mutual funds
and governments show a positive correlation, while the remaining
investor types seem to have a negative relationship to corporate car-
bon intensity. The correlation matrix does not include high levels of
correlation between the explanatory variables, confirming the
assumption that there is no multicollinearity.
The coefficient estimates in Table 9 reveal a significant negative
relationship between the ownership share of individuals, investment
advisors as well as mutual funds, and corporate carbon intensity.
Regarding governmental ownership, our findings from the univariate
analysis can be confirmed: government agencies hold a significantly
higher ownership share of carbon-intensive firms in comparison
to non-carbon-intensive firms even after controlling for other firm
characteristics. We do not find a significant preference for
or against carbon-intensive companies for institutional investors
and hedge funds.
7 | CONCLUSION, IMPLICATIONS, AND
LIMITATIONS
We provide one of the first studies to fully examine the exposure of
important investors types, namely institutional investors, hedge funds,
individuals, investment advisors, mutual funds, and government agen-
cies to carbon-intensive stocks, using a global sample of firms. We
combine different metrics to classify carbon-intensive stocks with
ownership information over a sample period from 2000 to 2015. The
applied approach allows us to investigate the extent to which the
portfolio values of these investor types are threatened by carbon risks
and to examine the ownership structure of carbon-intensive firms.
Our results reveal that government agencies in particular have
high exposure to carbon risk, with an average of 49% of their assets
under management invested in companies whose business models are
associated with high carbon emissions. Comparable numbers for all
other investor types are on a moderate level and average between
TABLE 6 (Continued)
Panel C: Stocks with worst e-score ranking
Year Institutionals Hedge funds Individuals Governments Investment advisors Mutual funds All investors
Panel C: Stocks with worst e-score ranking
Year Institutionals Hedge funds Individuals Governments Investment advisors Mutual funds All investors
2000 3.79% 10.24% 10.76% 20.69% 12.22% 1.98% 19.02%
2001 3.51% 10.60% 10.39% 22.58% 17.57% 2.15% 19.72%
2002 3.52% 11.64% 10.49% 18.25% 17.32% 2.39% 21.96%
2003 3.38% 11.80% 10.39% 20.45% 17.79% 2.65% 24.46%
2004 3.21% 13.24% 8.83% 21.38% 19.35% 2.29% 25.66%
2005 3.04% 13.66% 9.85% 34.58% 19.44% 2.32% 27.70%
2006 3.20% 14.63% 8.69% 38.70% 19.37% 2.55% 29.91%
2007 3.21% 15.53% 7.98% 37.56% 18.01% 3.95% 33.42%
2008 2.73% 13.73% 6.93% 38.12% 21.02% 3.19% 31.47%
2009 3.13% 13.73% 7.98% 32.19% 20.67% 2.82% 32.11%
2010 2.82% 14.42% 8.13% 31.91% 19.26% 3.39% 33.43%
2011 3.07% 15.01% 7.22% 36.01% 21.19% 3.33% 34.17%
2012 2.84% 15.05% 6.80% 31.17% 19.83% 3.44% 34.04%
2013 2.78% 15.11% 6.34% 31.10% 21.85% 4.10% 35.06%
2014 3.09% 16.37% 5.33% 31.13% 21.73% 4.71% 36.86%
2015 2.94% 16.07% 6.08% 30.39% 23.22% 4.83% 36.74%
Mean 3.14% 13.80% 8.26% 29.76% 19.37% 3.13% 29.73%
Median 3.11% 14.08% 8.06% 31.15% 19.40% 3.00% 31.79%
Std. deviation 0.29% 1.81% 1.69% 6.68% 2.47% 0.87% 5.74%
Min 2.73% 10.24% 5.33% 18.25% 12.22% 1.98% 19.02%
Max 3.79% 16.37% 10.76% 38.70% 23.22% 4.83% 36.86%
Note: The table shows the average ownership (ownershipsharesj,t ) in carbon-intensive companies of each investor group as the number of shares held in rela-
tion to the stocks' outstanding shares. The results in each panel vary due to the different categories of carbon-intensive stocks. Panel A represents the
results for the carbon-intensive stocks from the carbon-intensive industries. Panel B represents the results for the worst emitters according to the ranking
of their carbon footprint. Panel C represents the results for the worst emitters according to the ranking of their emission score.
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15% and 25% during the sample period. Overall, we observe a steady
reduction in carbon risk exposure for all types of investors from 2012
onwards, which can be attributed to the increasing inclusion of sus-
tainability risks and opportunities into the traditional financial analysis
(Friede, Busch, & Bassen, 2015). The results also reflect the increasing
number of asset managers who, since the second decade of the
2000s, have joined voluntary associations, for example, like the PDC,
with a shared ambition of decarbonizing their portfolios (PDC, 2020).
In addition to the highest (portfolio) carbon risk exposure, gov-
ernments also represent the largest owner group of carbon-intensive
companies held in their portfolios. It is important to note that some
of the largest oil and gas companies have not been publicly listed
(e.g., Saudi Aramco) but rather were completely in the hands of the
state during our observation period. The carbon risk that govern-
ment agencies build up in their portfolio is therefore likely to be
even higher than shown in this study. Thus, we can confirm the
dominant role of governments among owners of highly polluting
companies, which was already revealed by Earnhart and Lizal (2006)
for a sample of Czech companies, on a global level. Accordingly,
governments, as the largest shareholder group, would be able to
exert influence on corporate management to improve the risk expo-
sure of their portfolios. In this context, Calza, Profumo, and
Tutore (2016) empirically show that state ownership has a positive
impact on the carbon disclosure score of a firm, which indicates the
success of such engagement strategies. Besides, in their executive
function, governments represent both sources and key drivers of
prospective regulations concerning climate change. Accordingly, to a
large extent governments would have to bear the (financial) conse-
quences of such policies themselves, which could be one reason for
the inadequate implementation of the Paris climate targets to date
(see, e.g., Kollmann & Schneider, 2010).
Considering the entire carbon-intensive equity universe, we find
that investment advisors and hedge funds are the major shareholders,
with ownership shares averaging around 13% each. Accordingly, these
financial intermediaries are the main financing sources and at the
same time the beneficiaries of polluting companies. According to
Sandberg (2011), a critical factor concerning a possible engagement of
these owner groups is the fiduciary duty towards their investors. In
this respect, it is unclear whether this duty is consistent with non-
financial actions, like, for example, shareholder engagement for a
climate-friendly corporate policy. Nevertheless, in the recent past, a
stronger reference to sustainability also seems to have prevailed
among these investor groups, as expressed, for example, in Larry
Fink's highly regarded letter to CEOs. Therein the world's largest asset
manager promised to meet his eco-social responsibility as an active
owner and investor (BlackRock, 2020). Our results also provide an
TABLE 7 Carbon stock ownership of the different investor types—entire investment universe
Year Institutionals Hedge funds Individuals Governments Investment advisors Mutual funds All investors
2000 2.93% 10.53% 0.94% 2.52% 12.51% 2.41% 31.85%
2001 3.34% 11.57% 0.56% 2.12% 12.36% 2.79% 32.73%
2002 3.53% 12.02% 0.98% 2.01% 11.83% 2.71% 33.08%
2003 3.55% 11.29% 0.99% 1.89% 11.85% 2.67% 32.23%
2004 3.27% 12.24% 0.90% 1.42% 12.59% 2.58% 33.01%
2005 3.30% 12.65% 0.96% 1.52% 12.86% 2.61% 33.90%
2006 3.43% 12.72% 0.95% 1.40% 12.87% 2.54% 33.90%
2007 3.27% 14.76% 1.03% 2.57% 12.84% 3.71% 38.17%
2008 3.19% 14.07% 0.99% 2.52% 13.77% 3.06% 37.60%
2009 3.38% 13.33% 1.25% 3.43% 13.24% 2.97% 37.60%
2010 3.52% 13.47% 1.46% 3.09% 12.96% 2.85% 37.35%
2011 3.77% 14.16% 1.36% 3.11% 13.96% 2.80% 39.16%
2012 3.78% 14.11% 1.63% 2.14% 13.52% 3.13% 38.31%
2013 3.96% 15.26% 1.79% 2.46% 14.33% 3.69% 41.49%
2014 4.24% 16.41% 1.69% 2.42% 15.90% 3.85% 44.50%
2015 3.90% 16.37% 1.90% 1.94% 16.15% 4.09% 44.36%
Mean 3.52% 13.43% 1.21% 2.29% 13.35% 3.03% 36.83%
Median 3.48% 13.40% 1.01% 2.28% 12.91% 2.83% 37.48%
Std. deviation 0.32% 1.68% 0.37% 0.58% 1.21% 0.51% 4.01%
Min 2.93% 10.53% 0.56% 1.40% 11.83% 2.41% 31.85%
Max 4.24% 16.41% 1.90% 3.43% 16.15% 4.09% 44.50%
Note: For each year and investor group, this table shows their average ownership of carbon-intensive stocks (ownershipvaluej,t ) as the aggregated value held in
relation to the total market capitalization of all carbon-intensive stocks in the entire Asset4 universe.
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indication for policymakers about potential addressees of regulation,
namely, hedge funds, institutional investors, and governments. These
groups will have to play a major role in ensuring that financial flows
are consistent with the transformation to a low-carbon economy
according to the Paris Agreement (UNFCCC, 2015).
We further test the owner types' preference for or against
carbon-intensive firms, controlling for firm characteristics that are at
the focus of the traditional, return-oriented investment decision pro-
cess. Our findings confirm that governments have a significantly
higher preference for shareholdings in carbon-intensive companies. In
contrast, mutual funds, investment advisors, and individuals show a
significant reluctance to hold carbon-intensive stocks.
By classifying into different investor types, we comply with
the findings of Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson, and Grossman (2002) that
different investor types do not have homogeneous preferences.
However, it should be noted that preferences of distinct investors
within these more granular groups cannot be assumed to be
completely homogeneous either (see, e.g., Çelik & Isaksson, 2014).
As a further limiting factor, it must be mentioned that due to the
contemporary setting, we do not provide a causal interpretation as
to whether state dominance in the ownership structure has an
impact on the prospective environmental performance of these
companies. However, recent work by Pan, Chen, Sinha, and
Dong (2020) suggests a u-shaped relationship between state own-
ership and environmental innovation.
In this respect, we hope that this study encourages future
research to further investigate the effects of ownership structure on
the development of corporate CO2 emissions. Another suggestion for
future work is to examine whether the general tendency towards
portfolio decarbonization (see also, e.g., Benz et al., 2020) will lead to
a reaction of corporate management in terms of a CO2-efficient rede-
sign of business processes.
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TABLE 9 Regression analysis results
(1)
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ownership share (%)
Variables Institutionals Hedge funds Individuals Governments Investment advisors Mutual funds
Carbon-intensive −0.118 −0.008 −0.806*** 0.666*** −0.690** −0.415***
(0.117) (0.319) (0.279) (0.212) (0.324) (0.099)
Tobin's Q −0.101*** −0.354*** 0.313*** −0.191*** −0.147 0.047*
(0.034) (0.109) (0.106) (0.044) (0.114) (0.027)
Stock return −0.357*** 0.556*** 0.423*** −0.196*** −0.272** 0.151***
(0.047) (0.124) (0.131) (0.067) (0.126) (0.042)
Firm size 0.498*** 0.440*** −0.460*** 0.264*** 0.906*** 0.314***
(0.032) (0.098) (0.072) (0.056) (0.100) (0.023)
Asset tangibility −0.487* 4.195*** 1.212** 0.345 3.215*** 0.064
(0.254) (0.695) (0.559) (0.295) (0.728) (0.182)
Leverage −0.076** 0.069 −0.039 −0.001 −0.119* −0.059**
(0.037) (0.090) (0.057) (0.033) (0.072) (0.023)
Constant −7.444*** 2.624 11.976*** −5.162*** −7.413*** −3.927***
(0.706) (2.214) (1.611) (1.200) (2.250) (0.512)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 41,671 41,671 41,671 41,671 41,671 41,671
Adjusted R2 0.210 0.586 0.091 0.076 0.627 0.379
Note: For each of the six investor groups, this table shows regression results where the independent variable ownershipsharesj,s,t denotes the ownership share
of investor type j in firm s at the end of year t. We control for a set of firm-level variables, year, and country fixed effects and the variable of interest,
Carbon-intensive, indicates, whether the firm s is identified as carbon-intensive (1) or non-carbon-intensive (0). We estimate robust standard errors
according to White (1980).
*Statistical significance at the 10% level.
**Statistical significance at the 5% level.
***Statistical significance at the 1% level.
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